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1993] EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT OF AGENCY RULEMAKING
The Myth of the Unitary Executive*
CASS R. SUNSTEIN**
MR. ROSS: Our first speaker is Cass Sunstein, who is the Karl
Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of Chicago
School of Law and Department of Political Science. A prolific author
and lecturer on administrative law issues, Professor Sunstein is Vice
Chair of the Judicial Review Committee of the American Bar Associa-
tion Section on Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice. He former-
ly served in the Office of Legal Counsel at the United States Depart-
ment of Justice.
PROFESSOR SUNSTEIN: The Council on Competitiveness (Council)
certainly has become a very important and controversial entity in a
relatively short time. Even though the Council is fairly new, it is a
continuation of the 1980's trend toward presidential oversight of the
regulatory process, with a view toward reducing costs, introducing a
degree of uniformity and centralization, and promoting political account-
ability in the administrative process. I think that the role of the Council
has developed naturally out of mostly excellent innovations by President
Reagan with respect to the administrative process. I believe that the
Council, or a similar body, is necessary because there should be presi-
dential oversight of the regulatory process, with a particular view toward
reducing regulatory costs.
I think it is probably good to say that we start from that significant
common ground. It is my hope that the prospective Clinton Administra-
* The following is an edited transcript of Professor Sunstein's presentation at
an October 30, 1992 Colloquy, held at The American University's Washington Col-
lege of Law, on the role of presidential oversight in the administrative process. The
background research for this presentation was conducted in preparation for an upcom-
ing publication in the Columbia Law Review. See generally Lawrence Lessig & Cass
R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1994)
(developing in-depth notion of considerable legislative authority over administration of
Federal Government).
** Karl Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of Chicago
School of Law and Department of Political Science. A.B., Harvard College, 1975;
J.D., Harvard Law School, 1978. I am grateful to Lawrence Lessig, Assistant Profes-
sor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, for his assistance in developing these
joint ideas.
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tion would continue the concern toward decreasing regulatory costs and
ensuring a degree of uniformity and centralization.' Whoever is the
President for the next four, eight, twelve, or thirty years should build on
these precedents.
Notwithstanding what I have just said, I do have a major legal claim
to offer you, and I offer it with regret. It has become a pervasive view
within the executive branch, and to a large degree within the courts, that
the original vision of the Constitution put the President on top of a
pyramid, with the administration below him. This vision, set out in
numerous documents by the Department of Justice's Office of Legal
Counsel,' my former home, is not an accurate interpretation of the Con-
stitution. It is basically a fabrication by people of good intentions who
have spoken ahistorically.
3. One of President Clinton's first acts was to abolish the Council on Competi-
tiveness, but he vowed to create a more open and accountable system of agency
regulatory review. Clinton Administration Orders Pullback of More Than 50 Last-
Minute Regulations, DAILY EXEC. REP. No. 14 (BNA), Jan. 25, 1993, at d15. To this
end, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866 on September 30, 1993, in an
attempt to streamline the administrative process and to eliminate the improper influ-
ence of parties interested in agency rulemakings. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed.
Reg. 51,735 (1993).
4. For example, a February 12, 1981 memorandum written by the Office of Le-
gal Counsel (OLC) set out the constitutional basis for Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3
C.F.R. § 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 473 (1988) [hereinafter
Executive Order 12,291]. See Role of OMB In Regulation: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 152-69 (1981) (reprinting as part of Hearing Record,
OLC's Memorandum for Honorable David Stockman, Director, Office of Management
and Budget, Regarding Proposed Executive Order on Federal Regulation) [hereinafter
Department of Justice Memorandum]. Executive Order 12,291 requires federal agencies
to incorporate, to the extent allowed by statute, cost-benefit analyses when promulgat-
ing regulations. Executive Order 12,291, § 2. To this end, an agency must prepare a
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) and submit it to the Office of Management and
Budget when it promulgates a major rule, as defined by Executive Order 12,291, §
l(b). Executive Order 12,291, § 3(a). Among other requirements, an RIA must in-
clude: 1) a description of the potential benefits of a rule, and identification of the
likely beneficiaries; 2) a description of the potential costs of the rule, and those likely
to bear those costs; 3) a determination of the potential net benefits of the rule; and
4) a description of any potentially less costly alternatives, and the legal reasons that
these alternatives were not chosen. Executive Order 12,291, § 3(d)(1-4). The Depart-
ment of Justice Memorandum justified these requirements under the Take Care Clause
of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, and under the dicta in Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926). See infra note 22 (quoting Myers dicta setting, sub-
ject to interpretation, limits of presidential review of agency action).
[VOL. 7:297
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Given that the strong version of the Unitary Executive idea is an
ahistorical myth, the questions that we will be discussing should be
mostly ones of policy, not constitutional law. The issue is what policy
does it make sense for the Council to implement, not what policy does
the Constitution require the Council to follow.
With respect to this policy, I generally agree with the Council on
Competitiveness, with one possible exception. I am not sure whether
there is a disagreement on this point. I believe that there ought to be
full disclosure of private communications with the Council. When mem-
bers of the Council communicate with private people about the content
of rules in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the public should know.
There ought to be full disclosure of communications with the private
sector to assure the American people that nothing scandalous is happen-
ing, and to give them a sense of the actual process. That is my princi-
pal policy recommendation.
My beliefs with regard to the constitutional structure come with con-
siderable regret. I wish it were not the case. The executive branch's
vision of the Constitution, with the President on top and the administra-
tion below, has elegance, simplicity, and tremendous appeal. In the
modem climate, I submit that this structure would make much sense.
That, however, was not the Framers' original conception. The Constitu-
tion does not speak in those terms. It is commonly believed that the
Vesting Clause of the Constitution5 resolves these issues, but this is not
the case. The eighteenth-century conception of executive power was very
different from our present views. What has happened is that twentieth-
century categories and ideas are being used to give content to an eigh-
teenth-century document.
What I am about to say might seem a little bit historical and techni-
cal. It is both, I acknowledge; but it has considerable contemporary
importance. I believe that if Congress wants to regulate the Federal
Communications Commission in certain ways, by insulating it from the
President, and if Congress wants to allow the head of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to make decisions about the environment
instead of the President, or the Council on Competitiveness, then Con-
gress is fully entitled to do that. Would it be wonderful if Congress
acted in this way? It is hardly clear, but this is something the Constitu-
tion does not forbid Congress from doing.
In a nutshell, here is the constitutional argument. It first came to my
attention that the President might not be hierarchically superior to every-
5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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thing we consider "administration," by reading nineteenth-century texts
on administrative law. What persists in the nineteenth-century texts is a
distinction between execution and administration.6 These distinguished
mainstream people insisted that this distinction exists, and they said that
the Founders perfectly well understood this notion.7 The nineteenth-cen-
tury commentators, basically uncontradicted, said that there is execution,
involving foreign affairs issues and certain core executive functions, and
there is administration, which is essentially the ordinary policy business
of what we now consider the executive branch. The nineteenth-century
writers also believed that the Framers thought Congress could control
the relationship between the President and the administration.8 The nine-
teenth-century commentators thought that the President had a broad
sphere of control over what they called "execution," but that the Presi-
dent did not necessarily have hierarchical control over administration.9
It is alarming to people like me, who want to believe in the Unitary
Executive, that the nineteenth-century writers thought this was self-evi-
dent, and attributed their belief to the Framers. I have not found any
nineteenth-century source that has this hierarchical vision on which
Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Carter all have relied. At the very least,
the absence of nineteenth-century support for the twentieth-century view
is alarming, partly because the nineteenth century, by my calendar, is
closer to the eighteenth than is the twentieth.
Let us talk now a little bit about what happened in the eighteenth
century. I am just going to sketch out some historical facts. As Justice
Scalia eloquently argues, if anything ought to be under the President's
6. See Nathan D. Grundstein, Presidential Power, Administration, and Adminis-
trative Law, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 285 (1950) (surveying historical views of presi-
dential authority over administrative process). See also Louis FISHER, THE POLITICS
OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE ExEcuTivE 73-74 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter
FISHER. THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER] (discussing Congress's responsibilities in
supervising federal agencies).
7. See Grundstein, supra note 6, at 285-300 (discussing views of Founders). See
generally FISHER. THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER, supra note 6 (discussing constitu-
tional basis of President's ability to legislate and Congress's ability to structure ad-
ministrative state).
8. See Grundstein, supra note 6, at 300 Xarguing that, as creator and potential
eliminator of administrative state, Congress is superior to agencies, except as Congress
chooses to delegate authority to President).
9. See Grundstein, supra note 6, at 300 (restating theory that if President is
delegated authority, he can re-delegate this authority and direct decisionmaking actions
at his discretion; but if authority is delegated to agency, President has no discretion-
ary power over decisionmaking process).
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control, it is prosecution via the Attorney General. 0 Yet the Framers
actually did not put prosecution under the hierarchical control of the
President. They created an Attorney General, but they also created Dis-
trict Attorneys who were not subject to the control of the Attorney
General or the President." Right there, the defenders of the Unitary
Executive theory have to hesitate. Prosecution of the laws by Federal
Government employees was not under the arm of the President, and as
far as I have been able to find, no one thought that violated the Consti-
tution.
There are also the Framers' famous decisions of 1789 on whether and
how to put the heads of the Foreign Affairs Department, the War De-
partment, and the Treasury Department under the President." They end-
ed in a closely divided vote that many of the leading participants said
was a policy decision not made under constitutional compulsion, al-
though some of the decisions' supporters disagreed with this view. The
Framers ultimately did put Foreign Affairs and War under the
President's hierarchical control. But if we follow up on history a little
bit, things become much more complicated very quickly.
The first Congress had refused to put the Treasury Department for-
mally within the executive branch. 3 There was a very important public
official in the Treasury Department called the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency. James Madison, the greatest of the Framers, believed that the
Comptroller of the Currency would not be under the President's hierar-
chical control; because the Comptroller settled legal claims, his office
10. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705-06 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that because 1) prosecution is executive function, and 2) statute in question
vests this function in branch other than executive, statute in question violates Article
II of Constitution). Justice Scalia emphasized his belief that government prosecution of
crimes is quintessentially an executive function. Id.
11. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93. See Lawrence Lessig
& Cass R. Sunstein, The President and The Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1,
16-22 (1994) (examining federal prosecution practices of late eighteenth century, and
how they shed light on fallacy of Unitary Executive model).
12. The Decisions of 1789 refer to the First Congress's debates over presidential
removal authority of agency heads, in particular of the Departments of War, State,
and Treasury. See Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS
AND THE PRESIDENT 60-66 (1985) (reciting highlights of removal debate of 1789).
See also EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957, 10-
19, 101-02 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (summarizing various execu-
tive removal authority options debated by First Congress, and questioning whether
result supports Chief Justice Taft's argument in Myers).
13. For an instructive discussion of this aspect of the Decisions of 1789, see
FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER, supra note 6, at 40-41.
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contained "too much of the Judicial capacity to be blended with the
Executive" and subject to the President's plenary power. 4 Theodore
Sedgwick, another of the Framers, believed that in light of the
Comptroller's close connection to the raising of national revenues, he
"seemed to bear a strong affinity" to Congress.'5 Madison believed that
this office was distinct from both the executive and judicial branches. 6
If Madison was speaking for many of the Framers, and it appears that
he was, this has explosive consequences. The judicial function of the
Comptroller was similar to what many administrative agencies now do
in one way or another. This suggests that when administrative officials
do things that seem to bear a strong affinity to what Congress
does-and the EPA is an example in its rulemaking capacity-the
agency need not be, as a matter of constitutional compulsion, placed
under the hierarchical control of the President. If the settlement of legal
claims becomes judicial, and immunized from presidential control, then
the defenders of the Unitary Executive idea have a strong historical
burden to overcome. This is a real disappointment to any sitting Presi-
dent.
In 1792, the Postmaster General, the person in charge of the mails,
was treated similarly. 7 The office was reorganized, and he was given
the authority to enter into contracts and to make appointments. It was
said around the time of the Framing that this would "combine purse and
sword" by giving the President direct power over revenues. As a result,
Congress deleted the language putting the Postmaster General under the
direction of the President.
Because of all this, there is a big historical burden for the Unitary
Executive supporters to surmount. Prosecution was not under the
President's control, the functions of the Comptroller were not under the
President's control, and the functions of the Postmaster were not under
the President's control. The notion that any of this was unconstitutional
was barely discernable in this period.
What about the text of the Constitution? There is strong textual sup-
port for the view I have just suggested. The Opinions Clause of the
14. FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER, supra note 6, at 133 (quoting 1
ANNALS OF CONGRESS 613, 614 (1789)).
15. FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER, supra note 6, at 133.
16. FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER, supra note 6, at 133.
17. See Grundstein, supra note 6, at 299 (arguing that Postmaster's independence
from presidential control is evidence of administrative state's independence from presi-
dential control).
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Constitution" gives the President the power to demand the opinions, in
writing, of the heads of departments. I used to think that this clause was
an indication of strong support for the Unitary Executive view. But if
we think about it a moment, this interpretation would be redundant.
Why is it that the Framers gave the President the power to demand, in
writing, the opinions of department heads if these were people whom he
could hire and fire at his will, and whose actions he could direct? This
provision would make no sense under the strong Unitary Executive
model. The notion that the President must specifically be given the
power to demand opinions in writing seems to me very strong textual
evidence against the Unitary Executive concept. Furthermore, the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause 9 gives Congress constitutional authority to "en-
act all powers necessary and proper" to carry into effect not only the
powers of Congress, but all other powers vested in the Federal Govern-
ment. That suggests, at a minimum, considerable congressional control
over the organization of the judicial and executive branches.
This is simply the sketch of an argument. It produces, for me, the sad
conclusion that the strong Unitary Executive conception is an ahistorical,
policy-driven, extremely sensible anachronism that uses twentieth-century
ideas on an eighteenth-century document. Because the conclusion that I
have reached seems to me so unfortunate, I am trying hard to figure out
what can be done about it. Perhaps we should not really be originalists
about the meaning of the Constitution. Maybe the views of Judge
Bork" are wrong, in that the Constitution is a changing and living doc-
ument, with a high degree of flexibility.
Under such an approach to constitutional interpretation, perhaps we
have the ingredients of a new Unitary Executive idea. Maybe we can
say that "executive" has to be read in twentieth-century ways so as to
promote eighteenth-century goals. This seems plausible to me, given the
vastly changed character of the executive branch. This idea rests heavily
on notions of an evolving Constitution and the need to pay attention to
changed circumstances. This argument may be able to bring us towards
the Unitary Executive concept, but I do not think it can bring us all the
way there.
Let me now talk about some concrete issues that are very important
in Washington now and will be regardless of the outcome of the elec-
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
20. See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 81-83 (1990) (advocating originalism).
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tion. I am just going to address them cursorily. One issue is whether the
President, or any reviewing entity headed by Vice President Quayle,
Gore, or Stockwell, has the power to tell an agency what to do. As I
said earlier, the constitutional answer is no. He cannot dictate to an
agency head. The proper solution for the White House, at most, is to
discharge the agency head. The early opinions of the Attorney General
support this view." The history that I have traced supports this view.
The dicta in Myers v. United States,22 the most emphatic affirmation of
presidential power in the history of the Supreme Court, supports this
view. I assume that the Council on Competitiveness is in full agreement
with this conclusion. The EPA promulgates the regulations under the
Clean Air Act, not the President or the Council.
Incidentally, I should add that it is not clear to me, unlike many
critics of the Council, that anything the Council has done is illegal.'I do
not know enough about the details to challenge or endorse what the
Council has done, and my conclusions are no reflection on the Council
on Competitiveness.
Let us address the issue of private contacts involving the Council on
Competitiveness. If the Council is influencing an agency's decision on
the basis of communications with private individuals, it not only has a
duty to disclose, but Congress can require disclosure. In fact, I actually
think it would be a good idea to disclose. Even if it would not make
things fantastically better in terms of, for example, environmental protec-
tion, it would increase the legitimacy of our government by notifying
the American people of exactly when high-level people are meeting with
members of the private sector on the substance of proposed rules. It is
part of a very simple idea of open government.
Another issue is time limits for reviewing entities. As long as they
are reasonable and give the entity an opportunity to have its say, they
are a good idea. It should not be feared that a reviewing entity is killing
21. For an example, see 1 Op. A.G. 624 (1823) (advising President Monroe that
he was powerless to review Treasury Department's settlement of Major Joseph
Wheaton's account).
22. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 135 (stating that:
[o]f course there may be duties so peculiarly and specifically committed to the
discretion of a particular officer as to raise a question whether the President
may overrule or revise the officer's interpretation of his statutory duty in a
particular instance. Then there may be duties of a quasi judicial character im-
posed on executive officers and members of executive tribunals whose decisions
after hearing affect interests of individuals, the discharge of which the President
cannot in a particular case properly influence or control.).
[VOL. 7:297
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regulations through delay. Time limits would respond to that fear. I
suggest that there is no constitutional problem with imposing time limits
onto the reviewing process.
For me, the most difficult question is the policy issue with respect to
internal executive branch communications. Suppose the Council is going
back and forth with the EPA. Should Congress require disclosure of
these communications? Is there a legal problem if Congress requires
disclosure in these instances? If the President or the Vice President is
involved, there might be a constitutional problem with requiring disclo-
sure of all relevant contacts. And, certainly, there would be a problem
with requiring disclosure if we are talking about core executive agencies,
such as the State Department, the Defense Department, and possibly the
Justice Department. But I think it is almost certainly the case that, other
than in these instances, Congress can constitutionally require disclosure
of internal executive branch communications that influence rulemaking
proceedings. Thus, the issue becomes one of policy.
I do not like this conclusion with respect to what I would like the
Constitution to represent, or as a matter of sound constitutional policy. I
think the Council's argument, that the internal deliberative process
should be protected from public oversight, is persuasive. I do not agree
with the American Bar Association's recommendation that the delibera-
tive process be opened in all respects. Congress would not like an effort
to require its internal discussions with its own staff to be opened up.
General Motors would not like a requirement that its internal policy
discussions be opened up to the public. There is a terrible chilling effect
on internal discussion when it is exposed to public scrutiny.
Perhaps drafts that are submitted to the Council on Competitiveness
should be disclosed. I understand that is ACUS's position.2" But requir-
ing disclosure of this kind does not seem to be Congress's highest prior-
ity. I think their time is better spent elsewhere.
To summarize on the issue of internal executive contacts, I think that
if the President or Vice President is not involved, there is not a
constitional problem with requiring disclosure. In some rare cases, per-
haps, there is something of a constitutional problem. Usually it is an
issue of policy.
Let me give you my basic conclusion. As an originalist matter, the
notion of a strong Unitary Executive has been greatly oversold. We
should not be looking at the Constitution, we should be discussing poli-
23. See ACUS Recommendation, supra note 2 (outlining ACUS's 1988 recom-
mendation with respect to presidential oversight of agency action).
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cy. The notion of presidential oversight of the administrative and exec-
utive process, particularly with an eye toward controlling costs, is an
excellent policy innovation. In this role, however, the Council on Com-
petitiveness may not dictate rulemaking outcomes. It could be, and
should be, required to disclose private contacts. Time limits are fine, as
both a constitutional and policy matter. Finally, Congress should not
require that internal executive deliberations be disclosed to the public,
though there is rarely a constitutional obstacle to this requirement.
Thank you.
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